

Safety Implications of Full Transparency in the ICAO's USOAP



A G E N D A

- **What is the International Civil Aviation Organization?**
- **What are the Standards and Recommended Practices?**
- **What is the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme?**
- **The process of transparency in the USOAP**
- **Current situation of the information obtained from the USOAP**
- **The safety implications of full transparency**



ICAO & SARPs

- ICAO = UN
- ICAO adopts SARPs
- 18 Annexes
- ICAO does not have an explicit enforcement power conferred by the Chicago Convention

Every State undertakes “to collaborate in securing the highest practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, standards and procedures”



BACKGROUND OF USOAP

- 1953 – Notification of differences from SARP was not satisfactory
- 1994 - Safety Oversight Assessment Programme
- 45 assessments (Notifications \neq Level of compliance)
- 1 January 1999 - Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP)



TRANSPARENCY PROCESS

Transparency and Disclosure are born as a principle
(1997-1998)

- 1997 More transparency and disclosure in the release of audit results
- Transformation of the SOAP to the USOAP
- Results of the audits should be used for safety-related purposes only
- Final intention: identification of deficiencies to propose corrective actions to achieve the *highest practicable degree* of uniformity




TRANSPARENCY PROCESS

Sharing the information analysis

(1998-2000)

- 1° Step: To post the analysis of the audit findings
 - online
 - security
 - unidentified States
- Objective: to identify common areas of opportunity to resolve safety deficiencies



TRANSPARENCY PROCESS

Display of a non-confidential audit summary report (2001-2002)

- Proposal: To publish a non-confidential audit summary report of each audit
- Decision: To share safety-enhancing non-confidential information with States, ICAO and international and regional organizations
- Result: ICAO-Net

TRANSPARENCY PROCESS

Public Audit Reports (2004-2005)



Proposal:

Additional information =
ICAO-Net

Civil Aviation Authorities
identify deficiencies and
take appropriate
measures

Identification of non-
compliant States
through ICAO's
information

Decision:

Final safety oversight audit
reports available to all
Contracting States

Access to information
derived from the Audit
Findings and
Differences Database

Result:

Identification of non-
compliant States

31 October 2004 all
audit summary
reports were
published and
distributed



TRANSPARENCY PROCESS

Publication of the final reports in public website (2005-2008)

Proposal:

Final audit reports available to the industry and the public in general.

Decision: The states...

- should consent to publish the results
- could notify the progress
- 23 March 2008.
- identification of States that have not authorized the release of information

Result:

28 March 2008 six States had not given their consent: Iran, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Sierra Leone, Swaziland and Zimbabwe

16 July 2008 all audited States consented the release of the results

CURRENT SITUATION OF AUDIT INFORMATION

- AFDD designated to identify and quantify safety concerns in a State, Regional and Global levels
- Results and the level of implementation are public
- Alternatives to improve the implementation of SARP's



SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF FULL TRANSPARENCY IN THE USOAP

The International Civil Aviation Organization perspective

- 1st report of the initial audit cycle of the USOAP = 97% were audited as of August 2001
- The report covered Personnel Licensing, Aircraft Operations and Airworthiness of Aircraft



SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF FULL TRANSPARENCY IN THE USOAP

Findings:

- No appropriate legislative framework
- No appropriate established and funded civil aviation organization
- No appropriate *safety management systems*
- No appropriately qualified and experienced technical personnel
- Inadequate certification and licensing systems
- No basic surveillance systems
- Problems from no commitment of governments to support their Civil Aviation Authorities



SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF FULL TRANSPARENCY IN THE USOAP

- 1st report of the CSA Audit Cycle = 181 Contracting States, 3 territories and 2 Special Administrative Regions of China were audited as of 31 July 2004
- States that failed to submit a Corrective Action Plan or to rectify the deficiencies: Central African Republic, Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Micronesia, Nauru and Sao Tome and Principe




SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF FULL TRANSPARENCY IN THE USOAP

CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF A SAFETY OVERSIGHT SYSTEM COMPARISON

INITIAL AUDIT – FOLLOW UP MISSIONS

–Lack of Effective Implementation (%)–



■ 152 States – Initial Audit (2001) = 29.3%
■ 152 States – Follow-up Mission (2004) = 13.3%

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF FULL TRANSPARENCY IN THE USOAP

AVERAGE RATE OF FATAL ACCIDENTS PER MILLION DEPARTURES IN SCHEDULED AIR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS




SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF FULL TRANSPARENCY IN THE USOAP

CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF A SAFETY OVERSIGHT SYSTEM



–Lack of Effective Implementation (%)–





SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF FULL TRANSPARENCY IN THE USOAP

Regional Industry Accident Rates

Region	2005	2006	2007
Africa	9.21	4.31	4.09
Asia & Pacific	1.00	0.67	2.76
Russia & C.I.S. States	0.00	8.60	0.00
Europe	0.33	0.32	0.29
Latin America	2.59	1.80	1.61
Middle East & North Africa	3.84	0.00	1.08
North America	0.19	0.49	0.09
North Asia	0.00	0.00	0.88
Industry	0.76	0.65	0.75

KEYNOTES

- ONE. Safety is an element in motion
- TWO. The USOAP information must be used only for safety related purposes
- THREE. Transparency in the USOAP has been used as a “quasi-enforcement” power by ICAO when displaying the audit results to the aviation community
- FOUR. Transparency needs to be balanced with technical cooperation and assistance



